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Introduction 
The Arab Spring of 2011 has challenged the European understanding of the Ar-
ab Mediterranean countries. Pragmatic EU support to authoritarian leaders, 
which had marked EU policies for instance towards Tunisia and Egypt, seems 
no longer to be a meaningful foreign policy strategy. EU leaders have – half-
heartedly – supported the attempts by the Arab peoples of Tunisia, Egypt, Lib-
ya, Yemen, Syria etc. to “rock the casbah”1, but without a clear foreign policy 
vision and without a European consensus according to which this would be the 
obvious thing to do. The Arab Spring, however, is not only a question of break-
ing with authoritarian resilience. As implied in a commentary in New York 
Times, one of the unofficial ambitions behind the EU efforts is to hold off a 
wave of Arab migration toward Europe by attempting to provide sufficient 
economic incentive to stay home.2
As mentioned in this commentary, a recent poll in France pointed at a para-
doxical but easily understandable contradiction in the way in which recent de-
velopments in the Middle East are perceived in Europe: “while the events of the 
Arab Spring were presented positively by the media, most people were mainly 
worried that they would mean even more potential immigrants.”
  
3
Shortly after the Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali had left office 
and went into exile in Saudi Arabia, Tunisian migrants started to arrive on the 
Italian island Lampedusa, within a few days counting a population of several 
thousand immigrants from Tunisia, who were escaping turmoil in their coun-
try. The arrival made the Italian government declare the immigration situation 
a humanitarian emergency and raise the issue at the EU level. The reaction 
might have been exaggerated, as discussed by Leonhard den Hertog
 It seems that 
the European public is in support of the democratic progress in the Middle East, 
but remains skeptical about the consequences if they include an increasing 
amount of immigrants. Migration is again becoming a sensitive issue in domes-
tic politics within EU member states. 
4, but once 
again the migration issue grasped the media headlines emphasizing the Euro-
pean ambivalence: on one side the need for cheap manpower in the European 
labour market, on the other side the negative perspective: Europe “flooded” by 
millions of Arabs and Africans. The incidents with the Tunisian migrants at 
Lampedusa were in the media interpreted as a phenomenon which might 
threaten stability and security in the region.5
Within the last decade new developments have taken place in the Mediterra-
nean regarding migration movements and policy reactions to this important 
phenomenon. What used to be a system based on a distinction between coun-
tries of immigration and countries of emigration has changed into complex pat-
terns of continued migration towards Europe, transit migration through south-
ern and eastern Mediterranean states and trans-regional, globalized migration.
 
6 
At the same time increasingly restrictive immigration policies and external as 
well as internal EU securitization of immigrant groups seem to emphasize that 
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security concerns in the Mediterranean are not only a question of external secu-
rity and North-South issues but also focus on internal challenges in the in-
volved states and transnational developments such as irregular migration, 
cross-border crime and transnational terrorism.7 The complex character of the 
migration issue also containing a wide range of security aspects raises demands 
for further theoretical developments aiming at understanding important social 
phenomena beyond traditional state actors, organizations, institutions etc.8
Security has become a key issue in EU policies,
 
9 and in connection with the 
institutional cooperation related to the Barcelona process and the further devel-
opment of European-Middle Eastern cooperation, the political narratives relat-
ed to overall migratory movements, immigrant groups, ethnic minorities etc. 
have changed. Before 9.11, the Islamist opposition in the Arab countries was 
seen in many European narratives as constituting a substantial and important 
part of the political opposition to problematic regimes regarded as authoritarian 
by the EU. But as a result of the securitization of Muslim immigrants in Europe 
and the pragmatic policies dealing with the authoritarian regimes in the Arab 
world,10
This paper takes its point of departure in how changes in the relations be-
tween migration and security in a Middle Eastern-European perspective have 
gradually led to an increased securitization of immigration policies, and more 
concretely of immigrants arriving or staying in EU member states over the last 
decades. The paper will analyze how recent developments in Mediterranean 
migratory movements are dealt with in immigration and security policies of the 
states north of the Mediterranean. It will deal with Mediterranean migration as 
a globalized, but also regional and local phenomenon and the perspectives in 
European policies aiming at controlling and regulating migration movements, 
refugee flows and illegal migrants trying to reach European shores.
 the EU only reluctantly approaches oppositional movements and par-
ties in the countries south and east of the Mediterranean. 
11
Studies about European immigration policies towards the southern Mediter-
ranean have often focused on the “fortress Europe”, suggesting a more or less 
homogenous common European migration policy approach. This perception is 
being contested by the recent events concerning African and Arab immigrants 
heading towards Europe. The incidents have caused several unilateral actions 
by different EU member states and taking these events and the broader context 
of the political upheavals in North Africa as a starting point, this paper looks at 
disruptions within the EU-immigration regime towards the southern Mediter-
ranean states. 
 
Applying a political learning and historical institutionalism-approach, the 
paper analyzes how adaptations of national immigration policies affect what so 
far can be seen as attempts to establish a common European policy. Thereby the 
paper sheds light on the complex logics of actions of the EU migration policy. 
The relation between EU migration policy and national immigration policies is 
analyzed as a dialectical process of political learning, affecting both the national 
as well as the supra-national narratives about migration and security. 
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Lisbon, immigration and political learning 
The political reactions to the Arab Spring at the EU level have been followed by 
a rather differentiated pattern of behaviour by the member states. The new EU 
foreign policy set-up, established on the basis of the Lisbon Treaty, has thus not 
decisively altered the status of the EU as an actor, which is characterized by the 
fact that the member states more or less perceive themselves as independent 
states pursuing their own foreign and security policy. 
The Arab Spring is adding new dimensions to the role migration is playing 
in Mediterranean cooperation in the sense that what used to be a rather stable 
relationship between the EU and the authoritarian regimes of the Middle East is 
gradually changing into a new, dynamic and – due to the nature of the case – 
completely unknown reality, which seems impossible to predict and which 
might have serious consequences for the Mediterranean security environment. 
As pointed out by Roberto Aliboni and Fouad M. Ammor the EU and the Arab 
states over the years have developed a growing, yet mostly unspoken, consen-
sus across the Mediterranean related to the securitization of oppositional 
groups in the Arab world. The growing focus on security has resulted in the 
construction of an informal alliance between authoritarian MENA states on one 
side and EU on the other with consequences for the foreign policy and security 
strategies.12
The changing Middle Eastern political scene leads to a potential erosion of 
this consensus and possible informal alliance. If the weak, but stable and resili-
ent authoritarian states can no longer provider stability, law and order, the EU 
will have to consider if it is more appropriate to support the groups leading the 
unrest in the spring of 2011 in the Middle Eastern states. This is and will proba-
bly for years ahead constitute a complex and difficult political learning process, 
which already has started – as it can for instance be seen in recent documents 
and statements from EU leaders, which give tentative answers to the new Medi-
terranean challenges. 
 
The theoretical argument of the article is that because of the specific political 
learning process related to the Mediterranean cooperation and the given institu-
tional development within the framework of the policy instruments at the dis-
posal for the EU, the specific political practices tend to promote a pragmatic and 
consensus based foreign policy. The Lisbon Treaty has moved important as-
pects of migration policy to majority voting and co-decision. This has conse-
quences for the whole, broad range of migration issues which is dealt with in 
new policies developed recently in the EU system. 
 
Immigration and the institutional development of the EU 
As demonstrated by Desmond Dinan the development of EU’s foreign policy 
can be described as episodic.13 The changing of the treaties which constitute the 
foundation for the foreign policy activities, have taken place in a gradual pro-
cess, often attached to a national context, where EU-skeptical populations in 
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some member states have held up or postponed the development of the EU to-
wards an actual union with more explicit state-like features. The EU is a federal-
ist, state-like entity and the foreign policy of the EU might have state-like char-
acteristics, but the EU is hardly on its way to developing into a full-fledged 
state. As Dinan convincingly predicts the EU will continue being an association 
of states, which recognize the value of sharing sovereignty and resources within 
a limited spectrum of policy fields, but continue to see themselves as integrated 
parts of an international system, where the individual state retains responsibil-
ity for the main aspects of foreign policy, especially regarding security. 
With the appointment of a political leader both as the High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and as the Commission Vice-
President, it was the idea to create a stronger unity in EU foreign policy. At the 
same time and as part of the setup the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
was supposed to provide an efficient organization behind the new institutions 
and secure a stronger global impact. The appointment of a President of the Eu-
ropean Council should furthermore contribute to the Lisbon-based institutional 
structure and together with the President of the Commission, José Manuel 
Barroso, Catherine Ashton and Herman van Rompuy was supposed to form a 
leadership with formal competencies sufficient for launching a new, more ac-
tive EU on the international political scene. However, the EEAS is not really in 
place yet and still the surrounding world will have to wait and see how this 
foreign policy instrument will develop. In addition, the latest agency meant to 
enhance Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, the Union for the Mediterranean 
(UfM), has more or less stopped its activities.14
The EEAS has declared migration as one of the strategic priorities in the for-
eign policy relations of the EU and as a phenomenon, which the EU systemati-
cally is “placing on the agenda of its political, economic and social dialogues 
with third countries”.
 
15
In a recent European Parliament Resolution related to the development of a 
common immigration policy the relation between immigration and security 
appears in a number of contexts. The document is called A Common Immigration 
Policy for Europe
 Migration is thus, according to the official narrative of 
the EEAS, an issue placed in the center of external relations on behalf of the new 
institutional set-up after Lisbon. Official EU documents emphasize that migra-
tion in the context of the EEAS is to be understood as a multiplicity of phenom-
ena ranging from overall relations between development and migration in 
Third World countries, irregular migration, human trafficking etc., to integra-
tion of immigrants in industrialized countries. 
16
The structural composition of the document emphasizes that the security 
dimension was thought of as being important, when drawing up the document. 
The document consists, besides a short introduction, of 92 paragraphs. The first 
, but has a broader scope, which includes the security dimen-
sion. This can be seen in the introduction, where both external and internal se-
curity is touched upon, but later in the document a whole section is devoted to 
the issue – under the heading “Security and Immigration”.  
Peter Seeberg: The Arab Uprisings and the EU 
 
6 
42 paragraphs deal, in two chapters, with General Considerations (1-10) and 
Prosperity and Immigration (11-42). The second part of the document consists 
of 50 paragraphs, of which the first chapter deals with Security and Migration 
(43-76) and finally the last chapter with Solidarity and Immigration (77-92). The 
chapter titled Security and Migration, however, focuses on border management, 
irregular migration and returns, with a main focus on the common borders and 
other perspectives related to external security. 
 The chapter Prosperity and Immigration contains a section which focuses on 
integration, but without explicit formulations related to security. However, it is 
clear from the chapter, that integration is seen as an important activity in deal-
ing with an ageing population; European societies are facing a new  reality in 
the medium term, with the working age population projected to fall possibly by 
almost 50 million by 2060; whereas immigration could act as an important 
stimulus to ensure good economic performance in the EU.”17
On 25 May 2011 the EU launched a new policy called A new response to a 
changing Neighbourhood taking up the challenges from the new developments in 
the Middle East.
 Summing up the 
document is dealing with an essential challenge for the EU, and even though 
the document is very general in its approach it represents an important stage in 
the institutional development of the EU. 
18
The significant novelty about this is that it is produced in a context where, as 
mentioned, the Lisbon Treaty has moved all aspects of migration policy to ma-
jority voting and codecision.
 On the EU-homepage it is stated, that together with the coun-
tries in the Middle East, the “EU would launch institution-building pro-
grammes, collaborate closely on migration, mobility and security and launch 
pilot programmes to support agricultural and rural development.” In the policy 
document more detailed information can be found, which furthermore empha-
sizes the relationship between migration and security seen from the European 
side. 
19 This means that it becomes more and more diffi-
cult for the individual member states to uphold their right to maintain local 
practices in dealing with migration and integration of immigrants, which for 
some member states create serious internal political conflicts. Luedtke analyses 
differences between Belgium, France and the UK as to the level of “EU control” 
and concludes that “when Lisbon takes effect, legal migration will lose its ‘spe-
cial’ status and become a ’normal’area of EU law.”20 This might be the case; 
however, recent developments in the EU member states, for instance in Austria, 
Denmark and Ireland where EU skepticism is widespread, demonstrate that 
this process will tend to be rather long-lasting21, since in some of the EU mem-
ber states negative attitudes towards the EU are linked with anti-immigration 
positions in right wing parties and movements. Recent developments in the 
Middle East and the European intervention via NATO might be popular in the 
European public, but – as mentioned in the introduction – a development 
where migration flows towards European coasts are “ignited” will probably 
change this. 
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The description of the security threats as they are perceived in the EU consti-
tute a broad range of phenomena, which include more non-state related securi-
ty issues like migration, energy and resource security, climate change, non-
proliferation, combating international terrorism, trans-border organized crime 
and the fight against drugs.22 Ole Wæver and others have suggested the con-
cept “non-traditional security” to cover this complex range of phenomena, 
which do not deal with security defined in traditional geo-political terms and 
confined to relations between nation-states, deterrence, the balance of power, 
and military strategy.23
It is not unusual that the EU tends to solve problems by institution building. 
The Lisbon Treaty represents in itself an attempt to strengthen the EU foreign 
policy apparatus, so that the cooperation with the neighbouring countries can 
be broadened to cover a more comprehensive range of issues in an integrated 
and more effective manner. The new policy is based on the premise that the 
reform process in the Middle East takes place differently from one country to 
another, but that certain elements are required to secure a strong and lasting 
commitment to what is termed a “deep and sustainable democracy“. This is 
then, still in the same document, defined as free and fair elections, freedom of 
association, rule of law and fight against corruption plus a “security and law 
enforcement sector reform (including the police) and the establishment of dem-
ocratic control over armed and security forces”. 
 The important point is that non-traditional security is-
sues might represent just as challenging problems as questions related to state 
power and at the same time, because of their rather intangible character, are 
difficult to deal with. 
As hinted at by Kerstin Rosenow it seems that the attempts at constructing a 
common European migration policy can be seen as a prerequisite for a common 
EU integration policy.24
 
 She furthermore claims that the continued existence of 
a multitude of European integration schemes have contributed to slow progress 
regarding a possible harmonization of the integration policies within the EU. 
The development of instruments aiming at controlling and steering of migra-
tion towards Europe is also for that reason an important part of the develop-
ment of European institutions. Understanding the recent changes in European 
practices might therefore as mentioned earlier benefit from institutionalist ap-
proaches. 
Mediterranean migration and European political learning 
As pointed out by Adam Luedtke, individual EU member states might tend to 
securitize migration as a result of the fact that they react based on specific, 
negative experiences in the given state, whereas common policies formulated in 
Bruxelles tend to be more open and tolerant, apparently based on more princi-
pled positions. Luedtke explains this by referring to the fact that the “Eurocrats 
are free to take this pro-immigrant line because they do not face direct electoral 
pressure in the way that national officials do”.25 So if the actual narratives are 
analyzed the differences are obvious. The officials in Bruxelles are more sympa-
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thetic to rights and freedoms of non-EU citizens than it is the case in the mem-
ber states, where soft migration policies are “no-go area” for politicians who 
care about their own political future. 
Luedtke’s argument is mainly taking its point of departure in the debates re-
lated to the integration of immigrants in the European states and thereby to the 
question of inner security in the EU. A parallel argument can be brought for-
ward related to the outer security, where there is a gap between the official EU 
position and the actual practices in several of the EU member states. It should 
be mentioned that the theme is not without problematic political implications, 
as demonstrated by Christina Boswell.26
The idea that various aspects of European migration policies are constructed 
in a security context has been demonstrated by several scholars. The concept of 
securitization has been used in connection with analysis of different kinds of 
migration, maybe most frequently illegal migration. The illegality in itself 
makes this almost self-evident. In an almost “classical” article from 2000 Jef 
Huysmans claims that migration has become a meta-issue, and that it “has be-
come a powerful theme through which functionally differentiated policy prob-
lems, such as identity control and visa policy, asylum applications, integration 
of immigrants, distribution of social entitlements, and the management of cul-
tural diversity are connected and traversed.”
 An important discussion in connection 
with this revolves around the relation between the national and the EU level in 
relation to the discussion of migration and securitization. 
27
Huysmans argues, that the development of common migration policies is 
embedded in societal and political processes that articulate an endangered soci-
ety and that the Europeanization of migration policies thus securitizes migra-
tion by integrating migration policy into an internal migration security frame-
work, which partly feed into a negative politicization of immigrants, asylum 
seekers and refugees. As mentioned by Nathalia Tocci and Jean-Pierre 
Cassarino the “fear of terrorism, political Islam, smuggling and organized 
crime, unauthorized migration and the wider spillover effects of instability, has 
induced most Europeans, leaders and publics alike, to deepen a policy of con-
tainment in recent years.”
  
28
The concept of securitization is here understood within the framework of the 
so-called IR linguistic turn, as processes by which specific phenomena through 
speech acts are transformed into security issues, thereby legitimizing extraordi-
nary measures.
 Those phenomena together constitute the back-
ground for the securitization of immigrants and migration in the EU member 
states. 
29 However, this paper subscribes to a societal understanding of 
the securitization process, where the study of securitization not only requires a 
study of speech acts, but also of contextual factors, i.e. specific historical and 
institutional developments.30
Boswell points at securitization of immigration as an in some cases problem-
atic strategy for European states and takes the recent practice, where the EU has 
increasingly been “outsourcing” various areas of migration control and refugee 
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protection to countries in regions of origin. Her argument is that this outsourc-
ing of the implementation of immigration policies to regions of origin for the 
potential immigrants can be seen as a successful securitization.31 By “leaving” 
immigration and integration policies to the supranational level the individual 
EU member states are able to avoid democratic and public scrutiny, which 
makes it difficult for the media and the political opposition in the given mem-
ber state to involve public protest. The fact that other important non-state ac-
tors, like for instance NATO, are also considering migration as an important 
security issue adds to the “institutional alienation” of national migration poli-
cies.32
The process of securitization of migration has both an external and an inter-
nal dimension, which in many ways are interconnected. The tightening of the 
external borders is followed by a parallel tendency at opting for more aggres-
sive means at integrating immigrants into the Europeans societies – leading to a 
tendency at giving up on or maybe even pronouncing multiculturalism as a 
failure.
 Under all circumstances: the built-in democratic deficit in the EU-system 
in this case legitimizes a securitization of immigration and integration policies 
internally in the EU.  
33 Such new ways of dealing with immigrants arriving in Europe can be 
described as ‘civic integrationism’ (Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos), and represents 
“not simply a new brand of old-style xenophobia, but rather a self-consciously 
liberal response to the challenges of cultural pluralisation that seeks to distin-
guish itself from its primary competitor, liberal multiculturalism.”34
A different interpretation might take its point of departure in the EU and its 
changing institutional development, including the gradual establishment of the 
free movement of labour, which is a result of the Single European Act and the 
implementation of the Schengen Agreement with its open borders internally in 
the EU. With this development the external borders become more important, as 
shown by Aderanti Adepoju et al.
 
35 There is a logical interconnectedness be-
tween internal liberalization and external deliberalization, and this process is 
part of the political learning process that the EU experienced over the last few 
decades. It gradually became obvious “that there is a need to establish a com-
mon EU immigration policy to replace fragmented and inconsistent national 
regimes.”36
The EU is thus going through a process of political learning, where the insti-
tutions of the union seek to develop abilities at working with phenomena like in 
this case the non-traditional security migration issue. Since the launching of the 
“European Security Strategy”, A Secure Europe in a better World in 2003, which 
was characterized by focusing mainly on traditional security, new initiatives 
have changed this focus, gradually focusing on a broader range of security is-
sues, as it can for instance be seen – very explicitly – in “The EU Internal Securi-
ty Strategy in Action: five steps towards a more secure Europe” of November 
2010,
 
37 based on The Internal Security Strategy, adopted in early 2010 under the 
Spanish Presidency.38 
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The challenges from the uprisings in the spring of 2011 are being met by 
formulations in new EU documents, which see the EU attempting to solve prob-
lems in its neighbourhood by institutional means. An example of this can be 
seen  in A new response to a changing Neighbourhood, where it says that to support 
“democratic transformation, Comprehensive Institution-Building programmes 
(...) will be set up: they will provide substantial expertise and financial support 
to build the capacity of key administrative bodies (customs, enforcement agen-
cies, justice) and will be targeted in priority towards those institutions most 
needed to sustain democratisation. To build a stronger partnership with people, 
the Commission will launch a dialogue on migration, mobility and security 
with e.g. Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt (as a first step towards a Mobility Part-
nership). These proposals are further detailed in the Communication on migra-
tion, mobility and security in the southern neighbourhood.”39
 
 
Migration, security and the actual practices of the EU 
The unrest and uprisings in the spring of 2011 have contributed to uncertainty 
linked to the migration pressure from non-European Mediterranean states. The 
issue is no novelty and has a very complex background and character. The ac-
tual migration consists of ordinary labour migration, where this might be pos-
sible, supplemented by illegal migration, of which a part from time to time are 
normalized (in Spain and Italy), but also irregular migration, human smuggling 
and migration related to organized crime. A part of the migration movements is 
related to traditional chain migration, but all forms of migration are developing 
transnational networks, which emphasize the complex character of the phe-
nomenon. As emphasized by Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller in their classic 
textbook “The Age of Migration” the Middle East is containing all relevant con-
ditions for producing migrants. It is “an area where enormous political, cultural 
and economic diversity has resulted in many varied types of migration and 
mobility.”40
Middle Eastern migration takes place internally in the states and across bor-
ders locally. It is also regional – a large number of Egyptians work in Libya (the 
local perspective) as well as a large number of Egyptians work in the Gulf (the 
interregional perspective).
  
41 The largest population movements related to the 
Middle East, however, are transregional movements, first of all towards Eu-
rope.42 Until recently these movements seemed to be rather stable, as shown by 
Philippe Fargues et al: the “emigration from South and East Mediterranean 
countries (SEM) is continuing at a steady rate, while immigration to these coun-
tries is increasing, particularly in various irregular forms.”43
The Arab uprisings have resulted in new migratory movements, which are 
rather diverse, but to a large degree have a forced character. This is the case 
with the Tunesian migrants trying to enter Italian islands. The same is the case 
with migrants from Libya (be they Libyan nationals or transit migrants from 
other African states). The European coastline including the islands of the Medi-
terranean is experiencing a growing pressure from developments in the Middle 
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East that are still unpredictable.44
Various research projects have been documenting the migratory movements 
in the last decades in the Mediterranean region.
 Added to that forced migration is taking place 
from Syria, where people from the Syrian opposition  and to an increasing de-
gree ordinary citizens are trying to reach Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. In Leba-
non a large number of Syrian migrant workers are present, even though the 
number is smaller than prior to the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri 
in February 2005 and the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon. 
45 Taking the Middle East and 
its relations to the EU as point of departure it can be claimed that the political 
and institutional developments are creating huge challenges for attempts of co-
operation. On one side the complex challenges in the Middle East, not the least 
in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the war in Iraq, have led to pragmatic 
tendencies in European foreign policy towards the MENA-region.46
In understanding migration as an important issue in a security context, the 
role of transnational networks becomes highly relevant. Different phenomena 
attached to migration processes like chain migration related to family reunion, 
migration networks (be they official, semiofficial or clandestine), or ethnic dias-
poras all constitute examples of transnational social formations. But also more 
problematic phenomena like human trafficking or illegal migration activities 
organized by people smugglers can be seen as manifestations of transnational-
ism. With the tendency of securitizing migration movements and with the 
growing focus on radical Islamist organizations in the last decade the intercon-
nectedness between security and migration develops new dimensions in the 
narratives related to transnational social movements.  
  On the 
other side the EU itself is experiencing a continuously slow process of institu-
tional development, which only recently has seen the Lisbon Treaty beginning 
to materialize. 
Most probably the emphasis on transnationalism should not be exaggerated.  
Migration processes often take on accidental form, often reflecting spontaneous 
options rather than being consciously planned long journeys. The migrant – if it 
is not a labor migrant on a contract – will tend to spend long time, with several 
“stops” on the way, before he or she ends in a specific location where it is pos-
sible to earn a living, and often the final destination might be far from what was 
anticipated before the journey was initiated. The accidental character of (a part 
of) the migration processes adds to the security aspect attached to them. And 
from the receiving states this issue adds dimensions to the difficulties in dealing 
with the question, wether they are clandestine and explicitly unwanted or just 
“officially unwanted” but, as shown by Luedtke, in practice an expression of a 
de facto policy of labour migration, as in Spain for the last decades.47
It is an interesting irony, as demonstrated by Ahmet İçduygu, that “while 
most of the southern European countries on the Mediterranean shores together 
with other EU countries tend to be advocating or actually adopting a range of 
restrictive controls against the incoming migrant flows, their economies are able 
to absorb thousands of irregular migrants without any unbearable confronta-
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tion.”48 The important point here is that in European reality it is of course not 
only a question of absorbing irregular migrants, but of absorbing migrants in a 
broader sense. Southern European economies are in some areas hardly able to 
function without an influx of a cheap labour force from other continents, first of 
all, regarding Southern Europe, from Northern Africa49, but also from other 
regions of the world.50 And gradually this reality is spreading to the rest of Eu-
rope in the sense that a growing part of the unskilled European labour market 
is being dominated by immigrant workers.51
Europe is importing a labour force which Europe itself - due to population 
ageing – is no longer able to provide. The EU is experiencing radical changes in 
its demographic composition, which make it necessary to implement new strat-
egies. Therefore the EU has taken up competition with the US in attracting 
skilled workers. The European Commission launched in 2009 a programme 
called the ‘blue card’ intending to lure highly skilled third country migrants to 
the European economies.
 
52 But as a matter of fact this process started many 
years earlier. A shrinking European labour force has for decades been balanced 
off by immigration resulting in a process of mutual accommodation, on one 
side by the European host societies and on the other side by the immigrants 
arriving to Europe.53 According to a UN migration analysis, the EU currently 
integrates two million new migrants a year – a figure, which is likely to in-
crease, as demonstrated by several migration trend analyses.54 It should be em-
phasized, however, that this does not mean that attempts at preventing specific 
groups from arriving in Europe is brought to a halt.55
Traditionally the challenge has been met by the EU member states with dif-
ferent national integration strategies, but over time this has changed with the 
establishment of supranational immigration policies, which also contain an in-
tegration dimension. One of the EU documents  is called “Towards a common 
European Union immigration policy” 
 
56 and even though there might be a long 
way ahead until the EU will reach this goal, there is no doubt that steps on the 
way have been taken, so that immigration and integration policies at the na-
tional level gradually are being replaced by common EU policies. Still the con-
crete integration activities take place locally and will therefore have a tendency 
to reflect national strategies and concrete practices developed over the last dec-
ades.57
The different national integration strategies of course have to do with differ-
ent conditions as these are for instance described by Göran Larsson et al. in 
their analysis of minorities with Islamic background in Scandinavia and the 
Baltic states.
  
58 Different ideological and political traditions have contributed to 
the well known integration paradigms that characterize national and/or re-
gional discourses and integration practices within Europe. Rob Euwals et al. 
compare the conditions for Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Nether-
lands and demonstrate that a convergence has taken place, bringing the two 
neighbouring countries closer together regarding integration policies: “While 
Germany became less restrictive with respect to family reunification and family 
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formation, the Netherlands became more restrictive (…) From 2003 onwards 
Dutch naturalization policy started to become stricter.”59 However, Euwals et 
al. do not seek to explain the demonstrated changes by pointing at a suprana-
tional development at the EU level. Other analyses have also shown the same 
tendencies at convergence between the EU member states regarding immigra-
tion and integration policies and practices – and how these have been exposed 
to an increased securitization.60
 
 
Conclusion 
It has been the central ambition of this article to analyze how the development 
of the relation between migration and security in a European setting establishes 
a dialectical process of political learning process with important consequences 
for the development of the EU migration policies related to the Middle East and 
for the national immigration policies of the member states. As shown, the chal-
lenges related to the Arab Spring have contributed to this by creating more 
complex preconditions for European decision making. From a general perspec-
tive the historical development regarding migration and security seem to be 
affected by a limited process, which on one side presents a development, where 
the “ever closer union” logic results in a gradual transfer of decision making 
power regarding migration from the national to the supranational level within 
the EU, but on the other side still leaves room for national differences within 
this highly controversial issue. 
 The Lisbon Treaty and its gradual implementation do not seem to lead to 
radical changes of this pattern. The EU is still to be characterized as an actor 
where the member states more or less perceive themselves as independent 
states pursuing their own immigration and integration policies. And regarding 
integration policies there is a contradiction between rather intolerant local prac-
tices in some of the EU member states and more accommodating ideological 
formulations from the “Eurocrats” – not having critical voters to face. Some of 
the immigrants coming to Europe left the Middle East because they were sub-
ject to persecution in the native country, maybe because they were part of a po-
litical opposition to the authoritarian regimes. At least some of the same re-
gimes were until recently supported by the EU –  “rewarded” for their ability to 
secure stability in the European neighbourhood. 
As mentioned the focus on security for years resulted in the construction of 
an informal alliance between authoritarian MENA states on one side and EU on 
the other with consequences for the migration policy and security strategies. 
This pattern might be broken and the years to come will probably see an ero-
sion of the cooperation and consensus between the European and Middle East-
ern states founded on pragmatic realism on the EU side. The fact that migration 
has become high politics and constitutes an important part of foreign and securi-
ty policies contributes, as demonstrated by referring to the point made by Bos-
well (seeing securitization of migration as an in many ways problematic strate-
gy), to the complexity of the issue. This is because it opens a possibility for a 
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securitization of the migration issue at the national level, where mechanisms of 
inclusion and exclusion are results of political processes dealing with the chal-
lenges related to the historical development of European-Middle Eastern rela-
tions. 
The article has attempted to demonstrate how the EU is going through politi-
cal processes where the institutional structures of the EU seek to develop abili-
ties at working with non-traditional security issues like migration, environmen-
tal issues, combating international terrorism, trans-border organized crime etc. 
This highly complex field is in itself calling for new institutional frameworks; 
this paper thus shows how political learning on behalf of the EU is reflected in 
the official documents issued by different EU-institutions from the situation in 
2004, when the European Neighbourhood Policy was launched, to the recent 
situation, where the EU is seeking to find answers to the challenges related to 
the Arab Spring. 
The transregional interaction is influenced by the Arab uprisings and the ra-
ther stable migration patterns, which we have seen for decades in the Mediter-
ranean, seem – at least potentially – gradually to be replaced by new dynamic 
and unpredictable tendencies related to the local conflicts and unrest. The Tuni-
sian refugees and migrants reaching Lampedusa in the early months of 2011 
were the first representing new tendencies, followed by other forced migrants 
from Libya (or transit-migrants from Africa) leaving Libya. The Syrian refugees 
entering the neighbouring states represent so far relatively small groups, but it 
is rather unlikely that they will be the only forced migrants in the Middle East 
resulting from the dramatic events of the first half of 2011. 
The EU has  five months after the start of the Arab Spring issued a new poli-
cy, A new response to a changing Neighbourhood, which mostly has the character of 
general declarations of intent. As demonstrated the policy is a product of a situ-
ation, where the Lisbon Treaty is gradually being implemented while the EU is 
experiencing dramatic and unforeseen changes in its neighbourhood. Recent 
developments in the Middle East and the NATO intervention in Libya might be 
popular with the European public, but – as mentioned – a development where 
migration flows towards Europe increases, would probably change this. A 
changing EU is learning to cope with a new Middle Eastern reality both as to 
the migration phenomenon and in a broader political perspective, but has so far 
not changed its traditional pragmatic approach towards the Mediterranean and 
the Middle East.  
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